Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44591 
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dc.contributor.authorKauppi, Heikkien
dc.contributor.authorWidgrén, Mikaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:31Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44591-
dc.description.abstractThe member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aETLA Discussion Papers |x1161en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEuropean integrationen
dc.subject.keywordEU budgeten
dc.subject.keywordvoting poweren
dc.subject.stwEU-Finanzenen
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleDo benevolent aspects have room explaining EU budget receipts?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn585257884en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rif:dpaper:1161en

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