Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44591 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ETLA Discussion Papers No. 1161
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
The member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model.
Schlagwörter: 
European integration
EU budget
voting power
JEL: 
C71
D70
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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