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dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:47Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:47Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x366en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsupport resulten
dc.subject.keywordobject divisionen
dc.subject.keywordmarketen
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinsky solutionen
dc.titleTwo support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572499752en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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