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dc.contributor.authorShellshear, Evanen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14254en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43811-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x410en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCooperative gameen
dc.subject.keywordCoreen
dc.subject.keywordStable seten
dc.subject.keywordFuzzy coalitionen
dc.subject.keywordFuzzy gameen
dc.subject.keywordCore stabilityen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwFuzzy Setsen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCharacterizing core stability with fuzzy games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn595211569en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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