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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Shellshear, Evan | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-24T10:23:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-24T10:23:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14254 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43811 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefeld | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Papers |x410 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cooperative game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Core | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Stable set | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fuzzy coalition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fuzzy game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Core stability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Core | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Fuzzy Sets | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 595211569 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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