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dc.contributor.authorCambini, Carloen
dc.contributor.authorRondi, Lauraen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-24-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43542-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government's political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled. Finally political orientation does matter, as firm investment increases under more conservative (pro-firm) governments, but this effect appears to revert when the IRA is in place.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,69en
dc.subject.jelG31en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelL33en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelL90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRegulated Utilitiesen
dc.subject.keywordInvestmenten
dc.subject.keywordCapital Structureen
dc.subject.keywordPrivate and State Ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordRegulatory Independenceen
dc.subject.keywordGovernment's Political Orientationen
dc.titleRegulatory independence and political interference: evidence from EU mixed-ownership utilities' investment and debt-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640487610en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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