Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Genschel, Philipp
Plümper, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
MPIfG Working Paper No. 97/4
Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's California effect argument, this paper shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international cooperation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardisation of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonise interest taxation across EC member states.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
537.57 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.