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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Breton, Michèle | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sbragia, Lucia | en |
dc.contributor.author | Zaccour, Georges | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-06-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-29T08:56:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-29T08:56:49Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial cooperation in an IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations where no stable agreement is feasible. When more than one possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the initial group of signatory countries and the pollution level). | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x2008,33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q53 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | International Environmental Agreements | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Coalition Stability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltabkommen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhaltensökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Dynamic models for international environment agreements | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 568796861 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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