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dc.contributor.authorAlbano, Gian Luigien
dc.contributor.authorCesi, Berardinoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:14Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40648-
dc.description.abstractWhen procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive tendering. We prove that under complete information extremely severe handicapping is never a credible strategy for the buyer, rather the latter finds it optimal to punish the opportunistic firm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other words, when opportunistic behaviour arises, the buyer should use handicapping to "level the playing field".en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2008,19en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelH57en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Procurementen
dc.subject.keywordHandicappingen
dc.subject.keywordRelational Contractsen
dc.subject.keywordStick and Carrot Strategyen
dc.subject.stwBeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.subject.stwNichtpreiswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwVertragen
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.titlePast performance evaluation in repeated procurement: A simple model of handicapping-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn560329075en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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