Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40314
Authors: 
Neubecker, Leslie
Stadler, Manfred
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag 258
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the recent mergers in the oil industry. Oil is assumed to be a homogeneous good which is produced by a small number of firms with different unit costs. Merger formation is endogenously explained as a result of cooperative decisions. We show that the mergers are amongst very asymmetric firms if initial size differences are moderate. If size differences are large, however, the more efficient firms participate in the mergers, while the least efficient firms are not attractive partners and, therefore, remain independent in the post-merger market.
Subjects: 
Asymmetric horizontal mergers
Coalition formation
Oil industry
JEL: 
C71
G34
L71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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