Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40293 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Research Notes No. 01-7
Publisher: 
Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
The divergence between increasingly supranational financial markets on the one hand and still largely national supervisory structures on the other gives rise to tensions which reduce the effectiveness of the supervision. It lies in the interests of both the public and the private sector that the supervisory structures are commensurate with the risks in a global capital market. An extension of the framework of common minimum standards (at a high level!) and joint definitions and data standards are just as essential as an intensification of cooperation among the supervisory authorities. Self-regulation, market discipline and the inclusion of the financial industry in the shaping of the rules should be obvious elements of a modern supervisory regime. Banks which operate internationally see themselves caught between national regulation and cross-border activity every day. The combination of different sets of rules and supervisory authorities is a major cost factor and hinders the integration of the markets. The co-existence of national authorities operating in parallel risks violates the principle of competitive neutrality of supervision in a single market. This certainly applies in the EU, where not only internationalisation, but supranationalisation of supervision is called for.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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