Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40004 
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dc.contributor.authorDadasov, Raminen
dc.contributor.authorLorz, Jens Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T15:07:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T15:07:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40004-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a politico-economic model to analyze the relationship between mode of entry into a new market and institutional quality of the host country. A foreign investor can either purchase a domestic firm, what we consider as FDI, or form a joint venture, in which the control right over the firm rests with the domestic entrepreneur. In an autocratic regime, the ruling elite uses its political power to implement expropriatory policies. In an integrated firm the risk of expropriation targets the foreign investor whereas in a joint venture the domestic agent bears this risk. We determine the equilibrium level of the probability of expropriation and show that the ruling elite, by choosing it, discriminates in favor of the foreign investor. This has implications for the form of invested capital, and thus for the organizational structure of active firms in the host country.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 |x27en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelP48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordForeign direct investmentsen
dc.subject.keywordjoint venturesen
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.keywordexpropriationen
dc.titleMode of Entry and Expropriation-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654348987en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec10:27en

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