Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39726
Authors: 
Andreani, Ettore
Dummann, Kathrin
Neuberger, Doris
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Thünen-series of applied economic theory 103
Abstract: 
This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank. Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased.
Subjects: 
corporate governance
dual board system
principal agent theory
stakeholder theory
banks
JEL: 
G21
G34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
763.37 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.