Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39646 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
ZEI Working Paper No. B 01-2001
Publisher: 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bonn
Abstract: 
While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.
Subjects: 
Partisan Theory
Policy Boards
Monetary Union
JEL: 
E50
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
346.47 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.