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dc.contributor.authorBindseil, Ulrichen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:49:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:49:05Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39640-
dc.description.abstractOpen market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the bankingsystem and thereby to steer short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetarypolicy. Many central banks apply so-called “fixed rate tender” auctions in their open marketoperations. This note presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a modelof bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks facedspecifically an “under”- and an “overbidding” problem. These phenomena are revisited in thelight of the proposed model and the more general question of the optimal tender procedureand allotment policy of central banks is addressed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI Working Paper |xB 03-2004en
dc.subject.jelD84en
dc.subject.jelE43en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordopen market operationsen
dc.subject.keywordtender proceduresen
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank liquidity managementen
dc.subject.stwOffenmarktpolitiken
dc.subject.stwZinspolitiken
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.subject.stwBankenliquiditäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleOver- and underbidding in central bank open market operations conducted as fixed rate tender-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn824004736en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B032004en

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