Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39438
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 06-01
Abstract: 
In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.
Subjects: 
Sequential all-pay auction
complete information
generalized cost
generalized Stackelberg game
JEL: 
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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