Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37518
Authors: 
Niepmann, Friederike
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs D7-V3
Abstract: 
Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000), we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.
Subjects: 
bail-out
contagion
financial crisis
international institutional arrangements
JEL: 
F36
G28
F42
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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