Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476
Autoren: 
Roider, Andreas
Englmaier, Florian
Mühlheusser, Gerd
Datum: 
2010
Reihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Incentives A8-V1
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a moral hazard model with a one-sided commitment problem. That is, after effort provision, the agent is free to either stay with the principal or to leave and pursue his (ex-post) outside option, the value of which is increasing in effort. Depending on parameters, optimal contracts have interesting properties, such as first-best effort incentives, nonresponsiveness to underlying parameters, or inefficient separation. Moreover, the agent might suffer from a ceteris paribus improvement of his outside option. Potential applications of this framework include employment relationships and venture capital financing.
Schlagwörter: 
moral hazard
limited commitment
ex-post outside option
limited liability
JEL: 
D82
K31
M52
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

3



Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.