Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs No. D7-V2
This paper analyzes how a bank shareholder optimally designs the compensation scheme of a bank manager if there are agency problems between the shareholder and the manager, and how this design changes in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a problem of excessive risk-taking, bail-out guarantees lead to steeper compensation schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bail-out perceptions will make it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose ceilings on bank bonuses.
Bonus payments bail-out guarantees bank manager compensation