Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37198
Authors: 
Hakenes, Hendrik
Schnabel, Isabel
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs D7-V2
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes how a bank shareholder optimally designs the compensation scheme of a bank manager if there are agency problems between the shareholder and the manager, and how this design changes in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a problem of excessive risk-taking, bail-out guarantees lead to steeper compensation schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bail-out perceptions will make it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose ceilings on bank bonuses.
Subjects: 
Bonus payments
bail-out guarantees
bank manager compensation
JEL: 
G21
G28
M52
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
234.95 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.