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Garratt, Rodney
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2008,20
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dom inate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding spoil-division.
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Working Paper

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