Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35843 
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dc.contributor.authorDanziger, Leifen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:01:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:01:47Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35843-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4408en
dc.subject.jelJ38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNoncomplianceen
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen
dc.subject.keywordworking hoursen
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitive labor marketsen
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwArbeiteren
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen
dc.subject.stwArbeitszeiten
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleNoncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor markets-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612902471en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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