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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35794
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Jasso, Guillermina | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-12-02 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T11:58:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T11:58:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008120298 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35794 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality. In this model, wage-setters set workers' wages; they do so either directly, as when individuals vote in a salary committee, or indirectly, as when political parties, via the myriad of social, economic, fiscal, and other policies, generate wages. The recommendations made by wage-setters (or arising from their policies) form a distribution, and all the wage-setter-specific distributions are combined into a single final wage distribution. There may be any number of wage-setters; some wage-setters count more than others; and the wage-setters may differ among themselves on both the wage distribution and the amounts recommended for particular workers. We use probability theory to derive initial results, including both distribution-independent and distribution-specific results. Fortuitously, elements of the model correspond to basic democratic principles. Thus, the model yields implications for the effects of democracy on wage inequality. These include: (1) The effects of the number of wage-setters and their power depend on the configuration of agreements and disagreements; (2) Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even more; (3) When leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus, they are unwittingly inducing greater economic inequality; (4) Arguments for independent thinking will be more vigorous in small societies than in large societies; (5) Given a fixed distributional form for wages and two political parties which either ignore or oppose each other's distributional ideas, the closer the party split to 50-50, the lower the wage inequality; and (6) Under certain conditions the wage distribution within wage-setting context will be normal, but the normality will be obscured, as cross-context mixtures will display a wide variety of shapes. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x3850 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C02 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Wage-setter | en |
dc.subject.keyword | power | en |
dc.subject.keyword | consensus | en |
dc.subject.keyword | independence of mind | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dissent | en |
dc.subject.keyword | form of government | en |
dc.subject.keyword | probability distributions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | shifted exponential distribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | shifted general Erlang distribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | shifted mirror-exponential distribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Gini coefficient | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einkommensverteilung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnbildung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Macht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | A new model of wage determination and wage inequality | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 586145842 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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