Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/343538 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 178
Publisher: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Abstract: 
The decline of auction-format sales in favor of posted prices on digital marketplaces is commonly attributed to behavioral biases or secular changes in the market environment. This paper examines the latter by jointly modeling two forms of buyer opportunity cost within a standard symmetric independent private values framework: an entry cost sunk upon auction participation, and a mechanism-independent outside option reflecting the surplus a buyer can obtain from a close substitute at a known market price. A seller chooses between a second-price auction and a posted price; potential buyers decide whether to participate after observing their private valuations. The outside option endogenously partitions buyers into low-value types, who bid their full valuation, and high-value types, whose bids are capped at the outside option price, giving rise to qualitatively distinct entry regimes that the seller anticipates and actively shapes. Pressure from either channel strictly erodes the auction's advantage, but the seller's response to the two is asymmetric. The model yields testable implications that qualitatively align well with observed patterns and place weight on the outside option channel as a driver for the shift towards posted prices.
Subjects: 
auctions
posted prices
entry costs
outside options
mechanism design
e-commerce
JEL: 
D44
D47
D82
L81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.