Verlag:
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung:
Control of the purse is considered fundamental to Congress's role in government, but presidents have long sought to expand their own influence over spending. Do presidents undermine Congress's power by influencing the amount spent without securing changes to the enacted budget? Using original data from 1956 to 2018 and a differences-in-differences design, I find evidence that spending more closely matches presidential budget requests than if budget legislation were perfectly executed. Controlling for Congress's budget, I estimate that spending changes by thirty cents for every dollar change in a presidential budget request. This power is driven by presidents spending less than Congress appropriates when presidents request smaller budgets. This power persists after 1970s-era reforms restricted presidential discretion, is strongest in politicized government units, and is used across both parties. Overall, this paper demonstrates that overseeing budget execution provides an institutional advantage that enables presidents to undermine Congress's formal authority over spending.
