Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340781 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economics Plus [ISSN:] 2666-5514 [Volume:] 3 [Article No.:] 100014 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-9
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
I examine a policy-making game among countries that must choose both a policy instrument (e.g., a tax or a quota) and its intensity (i.e., the tax rate or the quota level) to price pollution. When countries price pollution non-cooperatively, they not only set the intensity inefficiently, they are also likely to adopt Pigouvian fees, despite quotas being better from a welfare perspective. Adopting a Pigouvian fee to address a multi-country externality generates a risk externality, and in some cases non-cooperatively chosen quotas can generate higher social welfare than maximum social welfare Pigouvian fees can deliver.
Subjects: 
Environmental policy
Global pollution
International relations
JEL: 
C72
D81
F50
H21
Q38
Q58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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