Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339550 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Citation: 
[Journal:] German Economic Review (GER) [ISSN:] 1468-0475 [Volume:] 27 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2026 [Pages:] 37-51
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Berlin
Abstract: 
Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data collection, the regulation seems an effective tool for protecting consumers against price discrimination. By contrast, I provide the insight that consent regulation alone is ineffective because it provides firms with the loophole to commit to unattractive offers to dissenting consumers. Effective consent regulation therefore requires an explicit regulation of the firm's dissent offer. This is informationally demanding; regulation that merely insists on "reasonable" (sequential rational) offers is ineffective.
Subjects: 
data collection
price discrimination
privacy regulation
JEL: 
L51
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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