Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338610 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Social Choice and Welfare [ISSN:] 1432-217X [Volume:] 66 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Place:] Berlin/Heidelberg [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 349-355
Publisher: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin/Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 that can be partitioned into the Banks set and the bipartisan set. As a consequence, the Banks set, as well as its refinements, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can be disjoint from the bipartisan set.
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Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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