Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338540 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Studies (CJAS) [ISSN:] 2169-7221 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 591-614
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
Using the small and medium-sized commercial banks' market entry reform policy implemented in 2009 in China as a quasi-natural experiment of banking deregulation, we examine its effect on corporate tax avoidance. Our empirical results show that banking deregulation significantly reduces corporate tax avoidance. Banking deregulation not only promotes the expansion of joint-stock banks and city commercial banks, but also increases the credit supply and bank competition in the region. Further tests imply that banking deregulation restrains corporate tax avoidance through two channels: alleviating financial constraints and strengthening external monitoring. Our paper sheds new light on the spillover effects from regulations in the banking sector to tax management behaviours in the corporate sector.
Subjects: 
Banking deregulation
corporate tax avoidance
external monitoring
financial constraints
financial supply side reform
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.