Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338459 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Studies (CJAS) [ISSN:] 2169-7221 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 469-489
Verlag: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Zusammenfassung: 
Tunnelling by large shareholders is a problem representative of ownership concentration. Large shareholders may interfere with a firm's information disclosure to support their tunnelling behaviour, causing a high stock price crash risk. Using listed companies in China from 2001 to 2019 as a sample, we find that more severe tunnelling can lead to a higher risk of stock price crashes. Moreover, we investigate potential factors such as internal control, operational performance, and split-share reforms, that may affect the aforementioned relationship. A high level of internal control and good operational performance will weaken the relationship, and the relationship is stronger before split-share reforms. The findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of the relationship given China's institutional background and better investor protection.
Schlagwörter: 
internal control
operational performance
Split-share reforms
stock price crash risk
Tunnelling
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