Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338431 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Studies (CJAS) [ISSN:] 2169-7221 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 380-409
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
This article examines the effect of anti-takeover provisions on executive excess compensation and find a positive association. Five further findings are as follows. First, among specific provisions, the anti-takeover provisions mainly used to delay the takeover process have a stronger effect on executive excess compensation. Second, the positive effect of anti-takeover provisions on excess compensation is more significant in firms with higher executive power, less independent boards, and higher managerial myopia. Third, anti-takeover provisions have less effect on executive excess compensation in state-owned enterprises compared with non-state-owned enterprises. Fourth, the impact of the ownership structure on the anti-takeover provisions and excess compensation is non-linear. Fifth, the anti-takeover provisions decrease firm value, especially in those firms with more executive excess compensation. This article complements the literature on the anti-takeover provisions and executive compensation, which has great significance for the improvement of corporate governance.
Subjects: 
Anti-takeover provision
executive excess compensation
ownership concentration
property rights
firm value
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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