Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337530 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] German Economic Review (GER) [ISSN:] 1468-0475 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 315-360
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Berlin
Abstract: 
This paper takes the canonical Burdett-Mortensen model of wage-posting and relaxes the assumption that wages are set once-for-all, instead assuming they can only be committed one period at a time. It derives a closed-form solution for a steady-state Markov Rank-Preserving Equilibrium and shows how this relates to the canonical model and performs some comparative statics on it. But it is shown that a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium may fail to exist because employers have more monopsony power over existing workers than new recruits and that this non-existence can be a problem for plausible parameter values. It is shown how a Rank-Inverting Equilibrium may exist. It is argued that this problem is likely to occur in a wide range of search models.
Subjects: 
monopsony
search
wage-posting
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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