Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673 
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dc.contributor.authorAddison, John T.en
dc.contributor.authorBarrett, Charles Richarden
dc.contributor.authorSiebert, William Stanleyen
dc.date.accessioned2006-04-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:13:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:13:50Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673-
dc.description.abstractThe paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more deserving workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contractsen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1866en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordseparating the various worker typesen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Sozialleistungenen
dc.subject.stwSozialrechten
dc.subject.stwSozialpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBuilding blocks in the economics of mandates-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn504099485en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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