Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336296 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Latin American Journal of Central Banking (LAJCB) [ISSN:] 2666-1438 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 1/4 [Article No.:] 100005 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-7
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
The standard macroprudential models focus on externalities and treat all prudential instruments as alternative, but equivalent, forms of Pigouvian taxes. This paper explicitly models individual banks' risk choices and shows that different prudential instruments affect banks' risk-taking incentives differently. Thus, conflicts may arise between the micro- and macroprudential stance.
Subjects: 
Bank risk-taking
Macroprudential regulation
Microprudential regulation
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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