Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336110 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 105 [Issue:] 11 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 775-780
Publisher: 
Paradigm Publishing Services, Warsaw
Abstract: 
Demokratien leiden häufig unter Kurzsichtigkeit: Politische Anreize, kurzfristige populäre Maßnahmen umzusetzen, lassen langfristige Wirkungen in den Hintergrund treten. Dies geht zulasten zukünftiger Generationen. Dieser Artikel entwickelt ein Konzept der Demokratie als institutionellen Entdeckungsprozess, der neue politische Regelwerke hervorbringt, um die Selbstbindung und Disziplin politischer Akteure zu stärken und sinkendem Vertrauen in die demokratische Regierungsführung entgegenzuwirken. Diese Regeln sollten in Pilotprojekten und schrittweisen Reformen erprobt und angepasst werden.
Abstract (Translated): 
This article develops a conception of democracy as an institutional discovery process for new rules, highlighting how political rules themselves can be innovated to address structural weaknesses such as short-termism and declining trust in democratic governance. It presents three institutional innovations - debt-sensitive majority rules, political contracts, and Catenarian Discipline - as experimental frameworks for aligning short-term political incentives with long-term societal welfare. While grounded in liberal-democratic principles, these proposals expand the design space for democratic institutions. Emphasising both theoretical foundations and practical implementation challenges, the article argues that institutional creativity can strengthen democracy and should be pursued through pilot projects and incremental reform.
JEL: 
D72
H42
H63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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