Zusammenfassung:
A broad consensus holds that agent banking networks expand financial inclusion, particularly when the formal financial infrastructure is limited. Effective governance of such networks, however, may depend on proportionate regulation and clear delegation of supervisory responsibilities from regulators to principals, and ultimately to agents. This study examines how agency banking standards are understood and enforced, which risks are most salient, and how self-regulation operates within Nigeria's rapidly expanding agent banking ecosystem. Mixedquestion survey design was employed, combining closed-and openended items to capture complementary quantitative and qualitative evidence from agents and financial service providers. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and thematic analysis. Findings reveal a concentrated risk profile centered on fraud and cybercrime, physical insecurity and robbery, and network unreliability. The agent association (AMMBAN) was viewed as effective in supporting compliance, and sanctions were largely perceived as fair and proportionate. Interpreted through an integrated principal-agent and stewardship theoretical framework, network scale has outpaced monitoring capacity in delegated oversight arrangements. This creates enforcement friction, which is partially mitigated by collective association-led governance. This study provides multi-stakeholder evidence on operational realities, refines principal-agent and stewardship accounts for high-velocity networks, and offers actionable guidance for regulators, principals, and agent associations.
