Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33550 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien
dc.contributor.authorPoutvaara, Panuen
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:39Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33550-
dc.description.abstractWe argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1918en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpolitical partiesen
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided platformsen
dc.subject.keywordnetwork formationen
dc.subject.stwPatronageen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwKlubtheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePolitical parties and network formation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn506211630en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
230.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.