Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335020 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 175
Publisher: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Abstract: 
This paper examines rebate rules in the context of public goods provision. These rules aim to redistribute the surplus when total contributions exceed the cost of the project. Using an axiomatic approach, we establish impossibility results that highlight the inherent tensions between fairness, participation incentives, and contribution incentives. We then propose and characterize the Proportional Rebate with Threshold rule, which identifies a coherent trade-off across these objectives.
Subjects: 
Public goods provision
Crowdfunding
Axioms
Rebates
Fairness
JEL: 
D63
D71
D82
G32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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