Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334742 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Scientific Papers of the University of Pardubice, Series D: Faculty of Economics and Administration [ISSN:] 1804-8048 [Volume:] 29 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 1110 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-12
Publisher: 
University of Pardubice, Pardubice
Abstract: 
This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on audit reporting. Whereas the specific purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of the number of audit committees, the role of independent (non-executive) board members, institutional ownership, and ownership concentration on the quality of audit reporting. Besides, this study also examines whether the role of the external auditor's reputation can moderate the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms to the quality of audit reporting. The results of testing of 189 units of analysis of manufacturing companies in Indonesia, obtained evidence that the size of the board of commissioners, the proportion of independent commissioners, institutional ownership influential and significant effect on the quality of audit reporting. Meanwhile, the audit committee, auditor industry specialization, ownership concentration proved not to affect the quality of audit reporting. For testing the external auditor's moderating variable reputation proxied by industry specialization, it turns out that only the relationship between the size of the board of commissioners and ownership concentration on audit reporting quality is proven to be moderated by the auditor industry specialization.
Subjects: 
Audit Committee
Ownership Concentration
Institutional Ownership
Auditor Industry Specialization
Indonesia
Independent Commissioners
JEL: 
M12
M21
M42
M48
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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