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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2026
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
QBS Working Paper No. 2026/01
Verlag: 
Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School, Belfast
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour: instead of bidding according to the Nash equilibrium, subjects appear to rely on expected value (EV) bidding. As a consequence, observed auction prices are higher than the theoretical benchmark, and the winner's curse occurs in a substantial fraction of auctions. We analyse bidding behaviour in detail and discuss the implications of our findings.
Schlagwörter: 
Japanese-English auction (JEA)
Wallet game
Continuous bids
Winner’s curse
Expected value bidding
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D63
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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