Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333259 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2366-049X [Volume:] 243 [Issue:] 5 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 543-566
Publisher: 
De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin
Abstract: 
Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29-49) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) is more effective than negotiations on individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman's hypothesis and indicate that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price may yield higher emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments à la Paris.
Subjects: 
climate negotiations
model united nations
negotiation design
uniform carbon price
JEL: 
C81
C93
F51
H87
Q54
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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