Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33237 
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en
dc.date.accessioned2005-12-07-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:09:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:09:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33237-
dc.description.abstractInternational donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, for example, poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support play a potentially important role for nongovernmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with nongovernmental organizations as intermediaries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1711en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen
dc.subject.keywordNGOsen
dc.subject.keywordaiden
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwNichtregierungsorganisationen
dc.subject.stwAllokationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleContests, NGOs and decentralizing aid-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn49722920Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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