Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331876 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 432
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Utilizing Connor's International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the method of setting fines for cartel infringements seems to have decreased cartel overcharges in the EU. In addition, the EU's cartel damages directive of 2014 (2014/104/EU) appear to have increased private damage payments. Overall, we find support that these two changes in EU competition policy have a reversing impact on the otherwise increasing trend of cartel overcharges, as making the infringement more costly at least in the EU.
Schlagwörter: 
Cartel fines
cartel damages
EU guidelines
competition law
antitrust
JEL: 
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-431-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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