Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/328148 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Economic Analysis (REA) [ISSN:] 1973-3909 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 127-137
Publisher: 
International Centre for Economic Analysis (ICEA), Waterloo (Ontario)
Abstract: 
We explore the links between credit expansion, inflation, and inflation expectations, and show that active public debt management can trigger a non-interest rate channel of credit expansion. This creates incentives for the government to use debt management for promoting non-debt management goals, thus, choosing debt maturity structure that differs from its optimal. Through a theoretical monetary policy game, we show that it is welfare improving to delegate public debt management to an independent office separate from the fiscal authority.
Subjects: 
Macroprudential policy
Fiscal policy
Central banks
Public debt
JEL: 
E58
E60
H63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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