Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326877 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers No. 2023-027
Verlag: 
United Nations University (UNU), Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht
Zusammenfassung: 
Using two lab-in-the-field experiments, we study whether initial transgression promote subsequent anti-social behavior. In the first stage subjects participated in an experimental market game. In the second stage, subjects were given an opportunity to participate in antisocial experiment. We find that subjects who impose a negative externality on uninvolved third parties in the market game are also more likely to burn their partner's income in the second experiment. This finding is consistent with a conscience-numbing effect but could possibly also be explained by participants' preferences for consistency.
Schlagwörter: 
Markets
negative externality
conscience numbing
moral licensing
moral cleansing
JEL: 
C93
D03
D62
D63
M14
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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