Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32610
Authors: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Güth, Werner
Miettinen, Topi
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,069
Abstract: 
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Subjects: 
procedural preferences
experiment
procedural fairness
JEL: 
C78
D63
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
493.11 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.