Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323676 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Dynamic Games and Applications [ISSN:] 2153-0793 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1037-1069
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York
Abstract: 
Abstract This paper investigates population games under ambiguity in which players may adopt decision criteria different from one another. After defining equilibria for these situations by extending well-known decision-theoretic criteria to the game-theoretic context, we apply these concepts to examine the case of two-person games played within a population whose relative proportions of decision criteria are unknown to the players. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which such games prompt the players to reveal their decision criterion through their actions, and we show when the relative proportions may be learned by observing the increasingly informed agents play.
Subjects: 
Decision criteria
Learning
Population games
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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