Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323405 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS) [ISSN:] 2459-5616 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 43-59
Publisher: 
Sciendo, Warsaw
Abstract: 
This paper will review important topics on the subject of auction theory and mechanism design, these include: efficiency first and foremost, also revenue comparison between different types of auctions and the issue of incentive compatibility, individual rationality with the general idea and proof that bilateral trade is inefficient. Mechanism design theory tells us that if buyers and sellers both have private information full efficiency is impossible, however Vickrey auction (single unit auction) will be efficient i.e. will put the goods in the hands of the buyers that value them most. However, the conclusion from this paper is that because of overvaluation of bidders the main result is inefficient, i.e. bids are too high. When weak and strong bidders are compared the main conclusion is that strong bidders' expected payoff is higher in second price auction (SPA), while weak bidder prefers first price auction (FPA) bid.
Subjects: 
asymmetric auctions
first price auction
Green-Laffont
Myerson-Satterthwaite
second price auction
JEL: 
D44
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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