Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323030 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
U.S.E. Working Papers Series No. 21-11
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht University School of Economics (U.S.E.), Utrecht
Abstract: 
Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.
Subjects: 
Public procurement
Collusion
Online markets
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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