Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322867 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 11-25
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibriumrefinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference.
Subjects: 
Signaling games
pragmatics
equilibrium refinements
evolutionary game theory
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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