Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322837 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 10-18
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reviews the economic theories of regulation. It discusses the public and private interest theories of regulation, as the criticisms that have been leveled at them. The extent to which these theories are also able to account for privatization and deregulation is evaluated and policies involving re-regulation are discussed. The paper thus reviews rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation, interconnection and access regulation, and franchising or bidding processes. The primary aim of those instruments is to improve the operating efficiency of the regulated firms. Huge investments will be needed in the regulated network sectors. The question is brought up if regulatory instruments and institutions primarily designed to improve operating efficiency are equally wellplaced to promote the necessary investments and to balance the resulting conflicting interests between for example consumers and investors.
Schlagwörter: 
Regulation
Deregulation
Public Interest Theories
Private Interest Theories
Interest Groups
Public Choice
Market Failures
Price-cap Regulation
Rate of Return Regulation
Yardstick Competition
Franchise Bidding
Access Regulation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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