Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322780 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 08-34
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
This study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with alternative hypothetical distributions, among which according to population shares, the distribution favoured by a social planner and the noncooperating Nash- Cournot distribution. By way of conclusion, a device is proposed to make the distribution of Olympic success more equitable.
Subjects: 
Olympic Games
public goods
externalities
social welfare
Nash
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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